Dynamics and equilibrium in the Cournot model with incomplete information
Abstract
Game simulation of agents’ rational behavior in the market of oligopoly with their incomplete awareness involves multiple repetition of the game and the construction of decisions made trajectory. The problem of constructing the trajectory that guarantees the equilibrium and efficiency from the point of view of assumptions concerning the current awareness of agents in conditions of their limited cognitive capabilities, the capabilities of the agents in determining the value of steps, the rate of convergence is important. A model of dynamic behavior in the Cournot market in the class of linear demand functions and costs of agents is presented. Using minimal information about the market and observing only the current market price, agents in the dynamics d based on the model of collective behavior clarify their output volumes. Sufficient conditions for convergence of dynamics to the Cournot–Nash equilibrium with the steps of agents varying from game to game, but equal in each individual game are obtained. Features and possible solutions for improving the dynamics are discussed. A comparative analysis of the conditions on steps value for a number of trajectories convergence is also carried out.
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For citations:
Algazina D., Algazina J. Dynamics and equilibrium in the Cournot model with incomplete information. The Herald of the Siberian State University of Telecommunications and Information Science. 2019;(4):10-15. (In Russ.)
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